By Stephen Hetherington II
AcknowledgementsContributors1. advent: The artwork of certain epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2. an issue approximately epistemic dependenceTim Oakley3. Accounting for commitments: A priori wisdom, ontology, and logical entailmentsMichaelis Michael4. Epistemic bootstrappingPeter Forrest5. extra compliment for Moore's proofRoger White6. Lotteries and the shut Shave principleJohn Collins7. Skepticism, self-knowledge, and responsibilityDavid Macarthur8. a cheap contextualism (or, Austin reprised)A. B. Dickerson9. wondering contextualismBrian WeathersonPart B. figuring out knowledge?10. Truthmaking and the Gettier problemAdrian Heathcote11. is understanding having the perfect to be sure?André Gallois12. wisdom by means of goal? at the probability of agent's knowledgeAnne Newstead13. Gettier's theoremJohn Bigelow14. wisdom that works: A story of 2 conceptual modelsStephen Hetherington
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Additional info for Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays (Perspectives on Cognitive Science)
The proof, of course, is Russell’s and is a priori. These two cases are intuitively very different. In the second case what was wrong was something to do with the ability of the agent to see what follows from what he is committed to. This is not so in the first case. The necessitation account of entailment, at least as we have used it so far, does not enable us to draw this important distinction. We are used to describing entailment to students in the following ways: (a) B entails C iff it is necessary that if B then C.
So consider this attempt: Jp dep Jq iff (i) Jp; (ii) Jq; (iii) q is part of an argument supporting p, all premises in which are justified for the subject; (iv) without q, there would be no such argument supporting p in which all the premises were beliefs justified for the subject. Clause (iv) is needed because if there were some other argument that supported, and thus provided justification for p, then p would not depend for its justifiedness on the justifiedness of q. , that condition (iv) will never be fulfilled, as there will always be other arguments frameable from the corpus of the subject’s justified beliefs.
The whole distinction between “derivative” or “inferred” or “non-basic” beliefs that owe their justifiedness to other justified beliefs on the one hand, and “intuitive” or “uninferred” or “basic” beliefs that do thus derive their justification on the other, is one between beliefs rather than believings. The philosophers interested in this distinction were concerned with such matters as ultimate sources of knowledge, and whether or not there were touchstones against which doubts or disagreements could finally be settled, and not with the presence or absence of flaws in individuals’ actual epistemic performances.